In this month's editorial, Jonas Follonier continues his debate with editorialist Olivier Delacrétaz, who responded in La Nation to his plea for moderate skepticism.
«This is the beginning of a controversy», wrote Olivier Delacrétaz in an e-mail about his response to my editorial «Le scepticisme, pour échapper au dogmatisme et au relativisme» published in Le Regard Libre last June. The editorialist of La Nation didn't think so. His fertile response to my text, reproduced in our previous issue, inspired me to reply in my turn, after thanking him for opposing my thesis. What better proof of respect than being taken seriously?
Since this magazine is intended for the debate of ideas, and since my praise of skepticism was not unrelated to the journalistic and intellectual approach in general, which I oppose to the tendencies of dogmatism and relativism, I thought that my «answer to Olivier Delacrétaz's answer» should appear in these pages. With the idea that a «response to the response to the response» might subsequently blossom in the columns of our Vaudois friends.
My adversary of the moment has faithfully transcribed my thinking, noting at the outset in his article that the variant of skepticism I defend is not the radical one of asserting that nothing exists, or that even if something did exist, we wouldn't know about it. My more moderate view is as follows: it's very difficult to reach the truth, but that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. In short, we should seek the truth, but without certainty. This necessary doubt does not, however, apply to logic and mathematics - I should have made this clear in my original text. Logic is the instrument of thought. Without the principle of non-contradiction, for example, we wouldn't be able to think that something is true, or false - in short, we wouldn't be able to think.
Olivier Delacrétaz praises my position, «which advocates critical thinking and humility in debate», but wonders whether it is wise to appeal to skeptical philosophy. His first argument is that dogma does not necessarily lead to dogmatism. To think otherwise is «a modern prejudice». Dogma is situated on a religious level and consists of «a truth so skilfully dissected, elaborated and purified that it becomes universal, thus escaping the particular circumstances of its birth». I don't have to say anything about this objection, which is not really an objection at all, since I've never spoken of dogmas, only of dogmatism.
Similarly, why does the author assert that the skeptic «doubts the capacity of our intelligence to reach the essence of things», which «renders philosophical effort futile»? Philosophical effort is not futile; its weapons are logic, argumentation and experience. Metaphysics - the rational study of the fundamental nature of reality - therefore has its place, but must take observation into account. A single fact or result contrary to the theory invalidates it. The empirical sciences, which operate according to this process of falsification applied to hypotheses, can never demonstrate anything other than the falsity of certain theses, in favor of others that are provisionally accepted. Hence the need for skepticism. Philosophy goes beyond science, but must be compatible with it, just as theology goes beyond philosophy, but does not contradict it. I don't believe that Aristotle or St. Thomas, two of the Waldensian League's most important references (whose La Nation is the fortnightly), say something different. As for truth in aesthetics, taken as an example by Olivier Delcrétaz, I can't deny its possibility, since I devoted my master's thesis to the objectivity of judgments of taste. When disserting on the beauty of a work of art or a landscape, you're not sure you're right, but you do have good arguments to put forward. And that's beautiful!
Another of his arguments is that skepticism would prevent knowledge, which would be sterilizing and disenchanting. «The skeptic is like a starving man who hovers around an apple, never ceasing to talk about it but forcing himself not to find it good enough to sink his teeth into.» This neglects the possibility that we can legitimately hold things to be true and make progress in our understanding of the world without having maximum certainty about things we can't deduce from logic alone. This is what probabilism allows, for example. In my experience, it's more likely that I exist than that I've been deceived by a malevolent god...
Write to the author: jonas.follonier@leregardlibre.com
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