Ukraine: who wants to fight for democracy?

Unpublished article – Clément Guntern

«We will never allow our historic territories and our loved ones living there to be used against Russia.» Those were the remarks by Vladimir Putin in an article published in July 2021 under his name on the Kremlin’s official website. In his view, Ukraine is Russian territory. However, this is not what a majority of Ukrainians believe. If the Russian president were to carry out his threats, who would come to Ukraine’s defense?

The year 2022 got off to a dramatic start, offering a glimpse of what the coming decades might look like. Power politics are regaining the upper hand, the likelihood of wars between states is increasing, and new forms of imperialism are asserting themselves. Along Ukraine’s borders or the shores of the Taiwan Strait, nations once defeated by history are seeking, if not revenge, then at least a «place in the sun» through a more aggressive and assertive stance. The temptation to act at this very moment is all the greater for Russia and China given that the United States appears mired in lasting instability and that Europeans remain incapable of speaking and acting with one voice. To reclaim the place they believe is rightfully theirs in the face of Western dominance, they will have to break a few rules and cross the Rubicon, as Russia may be preparing to do.

These ambitions are matched by the resources. Since 2015, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military spending has been on the rise, reaching a level in 2020 comparable to that of 1988—a reflection of the tensions that are emerging and escalating between rival powers. An arms race is resurging worldwide, this time coupled with more or less overt ambitions to secure a sphere of influence. Russia and China, in particular, are locked in a narrative of reclaiming lost lands and power. In Beijing and Moscow alike, the legitimacy of the autocrats is based in part on this claim. Yet the longer the status quo persists, the more their legitimacy erodes, compelling them to take decisive action.

The Front Lines of Tomorrow's Struggles

Most military leaderships around the world have acknowledged the paradigm shift from two decades focused on counterterrorism to a return to high-intensity conflicts. It is no longer just a matter of “high intensity”—a euphemism for inter-state wars—but of a confrontation that spans the entire spectrum of conflict: cyberattacks, special forces, information warfare, and so on. The means are commensurate with neo-imperialist ambitions.

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The front lines of tomorrow’s struggles are likely to be in Ukraine and Taiwan. Both of these states are part of a sphere of sovereignty shaped by history and by the current interpretation of that history by ideologues in Beijing and Moscow. Over the years, both peoples have demonstrated with increasing clarity their commitment to democratic values and the Western camp. They find themselves in a very uncomfortable limbo, torn between the vague camp of democracies and the demands of their powerful neighbors.

In both Moscow and Beijing, officials are showing their irritation. In Beijing’s case, Mr. Xi has clearly set a timeline for Taiwan’s «reintegration» into China. In Moscow, Mr. Putin is also expressing his frustration by escalating threats and raising the stakes. Both heads of state appear determined to resolve these issues, placing Taiwan and Ukraine at the forefront of a new era. If a large-scale conflict were to break out in the coming decades, it would likely be in these regions.

The West's Dilemma

Whether we like it or not, Westerners are stakeholders in the Ukrainian and Taiwanese issues. Historically, they have presented themselves as defenders of the law and the fundamental principles that shape today’s world, notably the right of peoples to self-determination and the inviolability of borders—though they do allow for a few exceptions, such as in Kosovo. It is precisely these two principles that are being called into question in Ukraine and Taiwan. The West’s position is significant because it, too, is part of this equation and finds itself on the other side of the divide. The United States has a law requiring the government to provide Taiwan with the means to ensure its own security. In Ukraine, a segment of the population is calling for Western support and dual membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

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At a time when Russia is making very concrete threats to invade Ukraine, the question of the West’s response to the challenge posed by the Russian president has become a fundamental dilemma. How should the United States and Europe respond in the event of an invasion? Formally speaking, the issue has already been settled: Ukraine, like Taiwan, is not a member of NATO nor does it have a U.S. security guarantee, unlike South Korea or Japan. There is therefore no legal obligation to actively defend Kyiv or Taipei. However, giving Putin and Xi free rein would force the West to confront other, far more serious questions: what value do we place on the inviolability of borders and the right of peoples to self-determination? Are these merely some of the international norms we claim to uphold? What rights do small states have in the face of great powers? And do great powers have a right to determine the destinies of small states? Failing to address this challenge is like opening Pandora’s box and breaching the moral and political dam that restrains violence in the international community.

The Impossible Balance Point

A «reconquest» by Putin or Xi would imply that, for historical reasons, a more powerful state would implicitly have the right to seize new territories. On that basis, Olaf Scholz’s Germany is the rightful owner of the Kaliningrad enclave, formerly Königsberg and the cradle of the Prussian state. But does defending these principles warrant a widespread conflagration? And conversely, in the event of non-intervention, would Moscow or Beijing be willing to stop there? This is the intractable dilemma facing Western capitals. A balance must still be found—if indeed there is one—between the risk of a larger-scale conflict amid a context of rearmament and the defense of principles that cannot be flouted.

If imperialist ambitions and rhetoric take shape in the coming years, months, or weeks, this threshold of stability—where diplomacy still has a role to play—may well prove impossible to reach. The West will have to make painful choices: either accept that the law of the strongest becomes the norm—admittedly by imposing sanctions that we know full well will never stop a determined autocrat from acting—or pay the price for defending its principles. To avoid having to fight, one must be genuinely prepared to do so.

Write to the author: clement.guntern@leregardlibre.com

Photo credit: © Oti_foti from Pixabay