How to reconcile liberalism and education, by Olivier Massin

On Saturday, at the Journée libérale romande co-organized by Le Regard Libre, Olivier Massin, Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, showed what kind of liberalism it is wise to defend if we value the idea of education. Striking.

It's worth posing problems clearly and unambiguously if we are to make progress in our thinking. The one posed on Saturday by Olivier Massin, Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, on the occasion of the Journée libérale romande*, is the following: liberalism and education seem incompatible. Indeed, if we assume that liberalism is opposed to paternalism (defined as the attitude of restricting the freedom of others), and if we assume that all education implies a certain paternalism, a liberal cannot consistently accept the very idea of education. As a good philosopher, we know that there are no thirty-six thousand ways of avoiding a conclusion,« pointed out Olivier Massin in Lausanne. Either you reject the first premise, or the second.» The professor's entire lecture then consisted in asking which premise it was possible to reject.

The speaker's first attempt was to challenge the second premise: no, education does not imply paternalism. Or, put more humbly, it is possible to educate without paternalism, i.e., without constraint on those being educated, those who educate or those who pay those who educate. This vision, which can be traced back to Rousseau, presupposes the idea of libertarian education, where the child is roughly speaking left to his own devices. And yet, it seems foolish to conceive of any kind of education in which there would be no constraints: is simply observing a child running around and eating the flowers he wants still education? No. The libertarian answer therefore seems to conceal a soft paternalism, which forces us to return to the premise that educating implies a certain paternalism.

Distinguishing between children and adults

Une solution plus raisonnable serait de revoir la première prémisse (il ne faut pas être paternaliste). Olivier Massin a proposé de la reformuler comme suit: il ne faut pas être paternaliste to non-consenting adults. The conclusion is that non-consenting adults should not be educated. This approach has the advantage of allowing for the education of both children and adults who, by signing a contract, accept certain constraints - typically by enrolling in university. We are justified in supporting this new premise by considering - as Aristotle already did - that the child has a vague moral and legal status. He's somewhere between a stone and a person,« said the speaker, with a touch of provocation. In any case, he doesn't have the responsibility of an adult, who has rights that the child doesn't have. And he has a right that the adult does not have, a kind of right to be educated.»

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Who is responsible for educating children? The state? First of all, it's the parents. Their responsibility to educate stems from their choice to have children. But quid children whose parents can't educate them - because they're dead, absent, physically or mentally restricted? One possible answer is that there are tragic situations, and that the existence of tragic situations does not oblige us in any way. The other answer is that it seems acceptable to force all individuals to pay for the cost of this education, and then to let this education be provided by people who are paid in this way.

Towards an empiricist, conservative liberalism

Le libéral est précisément méfiant à ce sujet, a rappelé Olivier Massin: il est conscient de toutes les dérives potentielles quand on laisse cet argent dans les mains de quelques-uns. C’est ici que le libéral doit choisir son camp – et c’est ici que l’exposé de l’universitaire a le plus séduit l’assistance. Le professeur a en effet objecté que lorsque le système d’éducation publique fonctionne bien, il ne paraît pas raisonnable de le changer. Il s’agit d’un argument typiquement conservateur, parce qu’il ne se base plus seulement sur le principe, mais s’appuie sur la valeur de solutions existantes.

Hume had pointed out the need to reconcile the two theories attributed to Locke, of whom he was a pupil: liberalism and empiricism. The liberal empiricist does not simply deduce principles from natural rights, in a purely formal way, but takes into account what exists, the state of the world. His ideas may be universally valid, but they're not the only ones. pro tanto («toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs»). En cela, les libéraux empiristes (Smith, Tocqueville, Hayek…) dont Olivier Massin montre l’intérêt se distinguent des libéraux rationalistes (Locke, Bastiat, Rothbard…) et se rapprochent des conservateurs (Hume, Burke, Scruton…).

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Reste à préciser avec Mill que l’on peut contraindre l’éducation, mais pas son contenu. Les exemples d’absurdité étatique sont actuellement légion. On pourrait néanmoins se mettre au moins d’accord sur certaines prestations indispensables, quelle que soit l’école. D’après le professeur, il n’est pas absurde de se dire qu’une éducation subventionnée devrait nécessairement comprendre l’apprentissage de l’écriture, de la lecture et des calculs, ainsi que la transmission de savoirs locaux, à commencer par la langue du pays. Elle devrait en outre respecter et véhiculer certaines valeurs, telles que la liberté d’expression, l’égalité des droits et le pluralisme. Voilà un beau programme libéral-conservateur, qui s’appliquerait également au médias! Merci, Olivier Massin. Et que la réflexion continue.

*Liberal Day 2023 «Training and freedom: contemporary challenges» was organized by the Institut libéral, Cercle démocratique and Le Regard Libre.