On Saturday, at the Journée libérale romande co-organized by Le Regard Libre, Olivier Massin, Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, showed what kind of liberalism it is wise to defend if we value the idea of education. Striking.
It's worth posing problems clearly and unambiguously if we are to make progress in our thinking. The one posed on Saturday by Olivier Massin, Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel, on the occasion of the Journée libérale romande*, is the following: liberalism and education seem incompatible. Indeed, if we assume that liberalism is opposed to paternalism (defined as the attitude of restricting the freedom of others), and if we assume that all education implies a certain paternalism, a liberal cannot consistently accept the very idea of education. As a good philosopher, we know that there are no thirty-six thousand ways of avoiding a conclusion,« pointed out Olivier Massin in Lausanne. Either you reject the first premise, or the second.» The professor's entire lecture then consisted in asking which premise it was possible to reject.
The speaker's first attempt was to challenge the second premise: no, education does not imply paternalism. Or, put more humbly, it is possible to educate without paternalism, i.e., without constraint on those being educated, those who educate or those who pay those who educate. This vision, which can be traced back to Rousseau, presupposes the idea of libertarian education, where the child is roughly speaking left to his own devices. And yet, it seems foolish to conceive of any kind of education in which there would be no constraints: is simply observing a child running around and eating the flowers he wants still education? No. The libertarian answer therefore seems to conceal a soft paternalism, which forces us to return to the premise that educating implies a certain paternalism.
Distinguishing between children and adults
A more reasonable solution would be to revise the first premise (one should not be paternalistic). Massin proposed rephrasing it as follows: one must not be paternalistic. to non-consenting adults. The conclusion is that non-consenting adults should not be educated. This approach has the advantage of allowing for the education of both children and adults who, by signing a contract, accept certain constraints - typically by enrolling in university. We are justified in supporting this new premise by considering - as Aristotle already did - that the child has a vague moral and legal status. He's somewhere between a stone and a person,« said the speaker, with a touch of provocation. In any case, he doesn't have the responsibility of an adult, who has rights that the child doesn't have. And he has a right that the adult does not have, a kind of right to be educated.»
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Who is responsible for educating children? The state? First of all, it's the parents. Their responsibility to educate stems from their choice to have children. But quid children whose parents can't educate them - because they're dead, absent, physically or mentally restricted? One possible answer is that there are tragic situations, and that the existence of tragic situations does not oblige us in any way. The other answer is that it seems acceptable to force all individuals to pay for the cost of this education, and then to let this education be provided by people who are paid in this way.
Towards an empiricist, conservative liberalism
As Olivier Massin reminded us, liberals are wary of this very subject: they are aware of all the potential abuses that can occur when this money is left in the hands of a few. This is where the liberal has to choose sides - and this is where the academic's presentation most appealed to the audience. Indeed, Massin objected that when the public education system works well, it doesn't make sense to change it. This is a typically conservative argument, because it is no longer based on principle alone, but on the value of existing solutions.
Hume had pointed out the need to reconcile the two theories attributed to Locke, of whom he was a pupil: liberalism and empiricism. The liberal empiricist does not simply deduce principles from natural rights, in a purely formal way, but takes into account what exists, the state of the world. His ideas may be universally valid, but they're not the only ones. pro tanto («all other things being equal»). In this respect, the empiricist liberals (Smith, Tocqueville, Hayek...) whose interest Massin shows differ from the rationalist liberals (Locke, Bastiat, Rothbard...) and are closer to the conservatives (Hume, Burke, Scruton...).
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It remains to clarify with Mill that education can be forced, but not its content. Examples of state absurdity are currently legion. Nevertheless, we could at least agree on certain essential services, whatever the school. According to the professor, it's not absurd to think that subsidized education should necessarily include the teaching of writing, reading and arithmetic, as well as the transmission of local knowledge, starting with the local language. It should also respect and convey certain values, such as freedom of expression, equal rights and pluralism. That's a fine liberal-conservative program, which would also apply to the media! Thank you, Olivier. And may the reflection continue.
*Liberal Day 2023 «Training and freedom: contemporary challenges» was organized by the Institut libéral, Cercle démocratique and Le Regard Libre.
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